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Introduction 
In modern legal parlance, copyright has become subsumed under a concept of 
Intellectual Property. This appears to evoke the justificatory package of individual 
property rights that has shaped Western societies since John Locke’s Second Treatise 
of Government (1690). Legitimising private ownership in the wake of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, Locke proposed that by ‘mixing’ labour with previously 
common goods a new ‘private dominion’ would be created. 
 
Characteristic of the property approach are exclusivity, i.e. the right to deny use by 
third parties of the intellectual territory claimed, and transferability, i.e. the right to 
transfer title of the intellectual territory freely to third parties.ii Trespassing on 
intellectual territory (unauthorised copying) has been condemned with the property 
term ‘piracy’ since the 18th century.iii The Eighth Commandment ‘Thou shalt not 
steal’ is still cited as a ‘sacred principle’ behind the provisions of modern copyright 
law (Laddie 1997, p. 2).iv 
 
In this chapter, we suggest that the concept of property is not very helpful in 
determining the appropriate regulatory policy for the creation and distribution of 
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culture. Property is that to which protection is afforded, not vice versa. In the case of 
copyright, it has been said that without the artificial scarcity introduced by property 
concepts, the costs of production of creative works will remain above the costs of 
copying. Creative production therefore would not take place.v This argument from the 
utility of property provisions is certainly implausible for a copyright term that is 
calculated from the life of the author (plus 50-70 years), and for a copyright scope 
that prevents desirable cultural engagement for example in adaptation and sampling.  
 
If there is another, independent (non-regulatory) moral argument for copyright, it is 
problematic. We shall argue that norms of authorship do not support claims to a 
private, exclusive, transferable domain of intellectual property; rather they justify an 
informational link between creator and creative products, and perhaps a claim to 
rewards from unauthorised exploitation of such products. 
 
The chapter is structured around the key evolutionary phases of the modern copyright 
paradigm: (1) the proto-copyright of crown privileges and letter patents, responding 
to the invention of the printing press since the late 1400s; (2) the 18th century Battle 
of the Booksellers, eventually asserting copyright as a limited incentive in the 
production and dissemination of cultural products; (3) the parallel development of 
author norm towards the end of the 18th century, associated primarily with the 
philosophers of German Idealism; (4) the 19th century statutory construction of 
abstract works to which all acts of exploitations refer, fusing the property concept of 
utilitarian incentives with restrictions derived from the author (culminating in the 
Berne Convention).  
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The justificatory arguments for music copyright are generally similar to those for 
other literary or artistic creations. Initially copyright mechanisms evolved for the pre-
dominant technology of book printing, with music being denied statutory protection 
until 1777. This changed with the early 19th century, when music became a trend 
setter in defining abstract work identity through the newly restricted acts of public 
performance and adaptation. The focus of the chapter is on the four jurisdictions that 
have shaped modern copyright: Britain, Germany, France and the United States.  
 
Proto-copyright: crown privileges and letter patents 
During the period dubbed the Renaissance by historians in the 19th century, several 
factors combined to turn copyright into a legal issue. The first factor was the 
emergence of a sense of individualism (realised in the art of Italian painters and 
sculptors). The second factor was a period of rapid economic expansion carried by a 
new class of international merchants. Commerce became organised around annual 
trade fairs which created an efficient distribution structure for new ideas (Epstein 
1998). In turn, the merchants themselves created a market of people with surplus 
income and demand for leisure goods. The third factor was the invention (around 
1450) of a technology enabling the fast and efficient reproduction of ideas: 
Gutenberg’s printing press. These elements were in place by the end of the 15th 
century, when an estimated 20 million books were circulating in Europe (Eisenstein 
1979). 
 
Reprints of popular books were soon pervasive, but the late medieval states had a 
ready made device for controlling the dissemination of new ideas while solving the 
profitability problem of some printers: the crown privilege. Awarding monopoly 
rights against a fee was the defining economic instrument of late feudalism (cf. North 
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and Thomas 1973).   Early printing privileges are documented in Venice (1469), 
Milan (1480s), Germany (1501) and France (1507) (Pohlmann 1962). In England, the 
first book printed with a privilege from the sovereign was published in 1518 
(Patterson 1968). The earliest known privilege for exclusive rights to print and sell 
music was granted on 25 May 1498 by the Venetian signoria to Ottaviano dei 
Petrucci for a term of 20 years (Püttlingen 2001, 141). 
 
Typically, crown privileges were issued to printers, either individually or collectively, 
mostly for a limited period of time, sometimes for specific books only. There are also 
many examples of privileges obtained by individual creators with court connections. 
The two systems operated in parallel. 
 
In Germany, we find letter patents protecting the work of authors and composers on a 
common law basis from around 1500. The first known imperial patent to a composer 
was Maximilian’s privilege for Arnold Schlick (1511). A prominent example was the 
protection afforded to Orlande de Lassus (1532-1594) who collected privileges in 
various jurisdictions (France 1575; Germany 1581). Privileges were influential at the 
Frankfurt book fairs which took place under imperial legislation. Emperor Rudolf II 
even issued a Mandat (1596) that gave preference to the protection of authors over 
publishers. Injunctions and substantial penalties were regularly enforced through the 
courts. This tradition disappeared with the religious wars in central Europe 1618-48 
(Pohlmann 1962).  
 
In London, the Stationers were a minor London guild of writers, illuminators, 
bookbinders and booksellers, established since 1403. With the arrival of the printing 
press, booksellers and printers became the two dominant groups. Stationers obtained 
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the right to print a new book by stating their claim before the Stationers’ Company 
Warden. Because of the monopolistic control of the London printers, this amounted 
to a safeguard of the right to copy, though the practice had its roots (as in France) in 
censorship: registering a book at Stationers’ Hall was necessary to legalize 
publishing.vi The Stationers’ Company royal charter of 5 May 1557 was an attempt 
by the catholic Queen Mary to control the spread of heretical material: 
 
‘No person within this our realm of England or the dominions of the same shall 
practise or exercise by himself, or by his ministers, his servants or by any other 
person the art or mistery of printing any book or any thing for sale or traffic within 
this our realm of England or the dominions of the same, unless the same person at the 
time of his foresaid printing is or shall be one of the community of the foresaid 
mistery or art of Stationary of the foresaid City, or has therefore license of us or the 
heirs or successors of us the foresaid Queen by the letters patent of us or the heirs or 
successors of us the foresaid Queen.’ (Patterson 1968, p. 32) 
 
In Saxony, central to the German book trade because of the annual Leipzig trade fair, 
a Bücherkommission governed by the Lutheran church formally controlled the trade 
after 1687. Like the London Stationers, the Leipzig Books Commission had to 
provide a body for both censorship and regulation of reprint. It was composed of a 
councillor, a professor, a Books Inspector (i.e. a policeman), and a clerk all working 
under surveillance of the Kirchenrat, the local Lutheran Church board. The Books 
Commission had the power to order bans, confiscations or further investigations 
(Curtius 1831, p. 204f. §1505; cited in Kawohl 2002a, p. 276). 
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Until the end of the 18th century, authors (and composers) typically handed over their 
manuscript against one single payment. John Dowland’s wife, for example, received 
£20 from George Eastland for ownership of the manuscript and half the dedication 
reward of Dowland’s Second Booke of Songs or Ayres (1600) (Dowling 1932). The 
Stationers’ Hall Book or Leipzig’s Eintragsrolle provided a safeguard for publishers 
against other publishers; it provided no institutional recognition of author’s rights. In 
fact, when selling on manuscripts (which was soon commonplace: a significant trade 
had developed by 1700) publishers were utterly unconcerned about the authors.  
 
A few exceptions are documented where authors started to assert themselves. Either, 
they came to some written agreement, such as Thomas Ford who upon registration of 
Musicke of Sundrie Kindes obtained the right (13 March 1607) ‘that this copye shall 
never hereafter be printed agayne without the consent of master fford the Aucthor’ 
(Hunter 1986, p. 271). Alternatively, authors with access to the Crown could obtain a 
letter patent of monopoly protection, much like the earlier imperial practices of 
central Europe. In 1575, Elizabeth I granted 21 year monopolies to Thomas Tallis 
(1505-1585) and his pupil William Byrd (1543-1623) which coincided with the 
publication of their celebrated collection of 34 Cantiones sacrae in the same year. 
Crown privileges sometimes conflicted with the interests of publishers, as in the case 
of George Withers who, after obtaining a letter patent for his Hymns and Songs of the 
Church (1623), took the Stationers’ Company to court (Carlson 1966). Prominent 
beneficiaries of English Crown privileges include Handel, J. C. Bach and Thomas 
Arne; in France François Couperin and Marin Marais; in Saxony, Bavaria, Prussia 
and Hesse-Darmstadt, Carl Maria von Weber (as late as 1826) and in Prussia, Johann 
Strauß the Elder, even in 1834 (Wadle 1998).vii While some composers succeeded in 
exploiting these early institutional mechanisms, others remained firmly locked into 
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restrictive relationships. Joseph Haydn’s contract of employment with Prince 
Esterházy in 1761 still contained a clause forbidding the publication of his works 
(Tschmuck 2002, p. 214). 
 
The old system of printing privileges and letter patents has been identified as a 
progenitor of modern copyright (Pohlmann 1962; Patterson 1968; Feather 1994). 
There are indeed striking similarities between privileges and copyright: both are 
granted by the legislator and serve as a means to protect printers, and sometimes 
authors, against competitors or unauthorised exploitation. However, there are 
important differences in practice, as well as in underlying rationale: unlike 
copyrights, privileges were not automatic and could be revoked; they could be 
granted both to printers of original books and to reprinters; and privileges would not 
extend past a state’s border (cf. Dölemeyer and Klippel 1991, p. 191) 
 
Apart from their role in censorship and raising revenue, crown privileges were also an 
aspect of protectionist economic policies. While occasionally recognising individual 
creativity, they remained part of an absolutist and mercantilist framework. Thus their 
legitimation waned with the decline of these economic and political systems: in 
England at the end of the 1600s, on the European continent half a century later. 
 
 
From the Statute of Anne to the US Constitution 
In 1690, John Locke proposed what would become known as the ‘labour theory’ of 
property. For our purposes Locke’s theory may be summarised thus: in a state of 
nature, goods are held in common through a grant from God. ‘Being given for the use 
of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, 
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before they can be of any use or at all beneficial.’  Every man has property in his own 
person. ‘This nobody has a right to but himself. The “labour” of his body and “work” 
of his hands, we may say, is properly his.’ If he ‘mixed his labour’ with a common 
good, it is converted into an exclusive ‘private dominion’. Private appropriation 
however is limited by a proviso: one may take as long as one leaves ‘enough and as 
good’ for others, and does not appropriate so much that goods ‘waste or spoil’. The 
first condition is akin to an equal opportunities provision; the second condition 
condemns waste as a diminution of the common stock of potential property.viii 
 
Lockean property thoughts have become part of the fabric of Western political 
expression. There are obvious resonances with contemporary corporate lobbying for 
intellectual property protection.  We are familiar with the argument that ‘creative 
effort’ and/or ‘investments’ justify ‘exclusive control’ of the ‘value added’. Natural 
rights are supposed to function as a constraint on political decision making. They 
cannot be overruled or amended to achieve desirable social outcomes. Intellectual 
property as a Lockean right may remain outside the scope of regulation. 
 
It is therefore remarkable that the first statutory copyright law conceived in a 
Lockean environment, expressly refused to grant copyright as a natural right.ix The 
so-called Statute of Anne came into force on 10 April 1710x and protected ‘Books 
and other Writings’ against reprints for 14 years from first publication, renewable 
once.  
 
Politically, the Statute of Anne was a response to the lapse on 3 May 1695 of the 
Licensing Act of 1662, a censorship law introduced by the restoration king Charles II. 
The Licensing Act had been announced as ‘An Act for Preventing Abuses in Printing 
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Seditious, Treasonable and Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets, and for Regulating of 
Printing and Printing Presses’, granting the Stationers’ Company the power to seize, 
destroy and levy fines with the effect of consolidating the monopoly of the London 
Stationers as the only legitimate publisher of printed materials. By the 1690s, 
parliament had noticed that stationers ‘are impowered to hinder the printing [of] all 
innocent and useful Books’, and that scholars were forced to buy classics and foreign 
books from the stationers ‘at the extravagant Price they demand, but must content 
with their ill and incorrect Editions’. (XI H. C. JOUR. 305-306; quoted in Patterson, 
1968, p. 139f) 
 
The Statute of Anne replaced the Stationers’ Company’s perpetual prerogative with a 
statutory but limited monopoly open to all ‘Authors or Purchasers’. The Act was 
constructed as a regulation of the book trade for the public interest, and the original 
Lockean preamble, referring to ‘the undoubted property’ that authors had in their 
books as ‘the product of their learning and labour’ was scrapped during parliamentary 
reading (Rose 1993, p. 45). The new preamble suggests ‘An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning’.  ‘Learned Men’ would now be encouraged  to compose 
and write useful Books’ because the consent of ‘Authors or Proprietors’ would be 
required for the printing, reprinting, sale and publication of their work (sec. 1). The 
wording remains ambiguous as to where the incentive should bite precisely: at the 
point of creation (author) or investment in publication and distribution (proprietor). 
 
[Insert Table 1: Statute of Anne] 
 
Music was not thought to be protected under the Act of Anne but although 
unauthorized publication of a composer’s work was therefore not illegal, accusations 
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of piracy still flew between music publishers. For example, three editions of Corelli’s 
Twelve Sonatas Op. 5 were available in London around 1700: the Rome edition 
imported by Banister and King, Roger’s Amsterdam edition sold by Francis Vaillant, 
and Walsh’s, copied from the Rome edition. Roger and Walsh tried to compete on 
authenticity, citing corrections by various Italian musicians associated with Corelli. 
The composer would not have seen any financial benefits from these activities 
(Hunter 1986; Rasch 2002).  Interestingly 18th century music publishers, unlike their 
book selling colleagues, did not lobby for statutory protection. ‘For music publishers, 
the maintenance of copyright protection over 14 or 28 years was unnecessary, as most 
musical works would not remain in fashion that long’ (Hunter 1986, p. 276). It 
appears that the control of distribution channels and predatory pricing against new 
entrants was as effective a means of market dominance as statutory protection. 
Copyright law cannot be evaluated independently of economic behaviour.xi 
 
The two most important copyright cases of the 18th century were the King’s Bench 
decision in Millar v. Taylor (1769), in which an author’s perpetual right in common 
law was asserted on the basis of Lockean arguments; and Donaldson v. Becket 
(1774), in which the House of Lords upheld the public interest aims of the Statute of 
Anne. Overturning Millar v. Taylor, Donaldson v. Becket exposed copyright as 
created and limited by statute. As Lord Chief Justice De Grey remarked critically in 
the Donaldson case: ‘The truth is, the idea of a common-law right in perpetuity was 
not taken up till after that failure (of the booksellers) in procuring a new statute for 
the enlargement of term. If (say the parties concerned) the legislature will not do it for 
us, we will do it without their assistance; and then we begin to hear of this new 
doctrine, the common-law right ...’ (17 Cobbett’s Parliamentary History 953, at 992; 
quoted in Patterson 1968, p. 178).  These cases influenced the development of both 
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American and European copyright law, articulating many of the concepts in which 
copyright is still discussed today. They warrant a closer look. 
 
In Millar v. Taylor (1769, 98 English Reports 92; also Burrow 1773), Robert Taylor, 
a printer from Berwick, had published an edition of The Seasons by James Thomson 
which Andrew Millar, a London bookseller, had purchased from the author in 1729. 
Thomson died in 1748, and it was evident that the (once renewable) 14 year term of 
the Act of Anne must have expired when the case was brought in 1767. Millar argued 
that there existed a perpetual author right under common law, independently of the 
statutory provisions of the Act of Anne. The King’s Bench court, dominated by the 
eminent jurist William Murray (Lord Mansfield) who was involved in many of the 
early copyright cases, supported Millar’s claim from first principles of property:  
 
‘Because it is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own 
ingenuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name, without his 
consent. It is fit, that he should judge when to publish, or whether he ever will 
publish. It is fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication; 
how many; what volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will 
trust the accuracy and correctness of the impression; in whose honesty he will 
confide, not to foist in additions; with other reasonings of the same effect.’ (98 
English Reports, p. 252) 
 
Strangely, the court did not even consider why such an author right should be 
structured as property, transferable to a London bookseller in perpetuity? After all, 
Mansfield appears to argue for two kinds of author rights: (1) reward for labour; and 
(2) the right to protect an author’s reputation by preserving the integrity and source of 
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a work. These rights could have been provided independently of property interests 
(see final section below). Lyman Patterson has argued that Lord Mansfield’s opinion 
in Millar v. Taylor prevented the development of a doctrine of author rights under 
common law independently of a publisher’s exclusive property control. (Patterson 
1968, ch. 8; see also Patterson 1987)  In doing so, Mansfield sowed the seeds for the 
modern misery of copyright, pace the Lords’ decision in Donaldson. 
 
Donaldson v. Becket (1774, 2 Brown’s Prerogative Cases 129, 1 English Reports 
837; also Burrow, 1774) is probably the most celebrated of all copyright cases. 
Reasserting the 14 year term of the Statute of Anne, and perhaps abolishing the 
author’s common law copyright, the case was eventually decided by a simple vote in 
the House of Lords. ‘Thus the peers gave an answer to the literary-property question, 
but they did not provide a rationale.’ (Rose 1993, p. 103). Unsurprisingly, Donaldson 
v. Becket has been interpreted and reinterpreted ever since. Debate is still raging 
today about which Lord Judge meant what (cf. Deazleay 2003). The case was 
uniquely dramatic, enthralling the contemporary literary scene. People queued for 
admittance to the final hearing. 
 
Alexander Donaldson was an Edinburgh bookseller who specialised in reprints of 
literary standards. In 1763, he had set up a shop in London where he sold his books at 
30-50 percent less than London prices (Rose 1993, p. 93). In 1768, Donaldson 
deliberately and provocatively brought out another edition of Thomson’s The Seasons 
(the subject of the litigatation in Miller v. Taylor). Upon Andrew Millar’s death in 
1768, Thomas Becket and fourteen stationers purchased the copyrights of Millar’s 
estate at auction for £505 (13 June 1769).  Donaldson was excluded from the sale.  In 
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November 1772, Becket and his partners obtained an injunction against Donaldson 
who was said to have sold several thousand copies of The Seasons printed in 
Edinburgh. Donaldson appealed to the House of Lords where the case was heard on 
22 February 1774. Five questions were directed to the Lord Judges (98 English 
Reports 257-258): 
1. Whether an author of a book or literary composition had at common 
law ‘the sole right of first printing and publishing the same for 
sale,’ and a right of action against a person printing, publishing, 
and selling without his consent. Held, yes by a vote of 10 to 1. 
2. If the author had such a right, did the law take it away upon his 
publishing the book or literary composition; and might any 
person thereafter be free to reprint and sell the work? Held, no by 
a vote of 7 to 4. 
3. Assuming the right of common law, was it taken away by the 
Statute of Anne, and is an author limited to the terms and 
conditions of that statute for his remedy? Held, yes by a vote 6 to 
5. 
4. Whether an author of any literary composition and his assigns have 
the sole right of printing and publishing the same in perpetuity 
by the common law? Held, yes by a vote of 7 to 4. 
5. Whether this right was restrained or taken away by the Statute of 
Anne? Held, yes by a vote of 6 to 5. 
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The first three questions refer to the rights of the author, the latter two were phrased 
in terms of ‘the author and his assigns’, the language of the Statute of Anne and, in 
practice, the rights of the booksellers. Following the decision in Donaldson, copyright 
was again a right created and limited by statute, not a source of income for the 
London stationers under the veil of perpetual author interests exercised by assigned 
proprietors. 
 
The notion of copyright as a regulation for the benefit of the public, incentivising 
creative production, was most emphatically adopted by the United States. The US 
Constitutional Convention convened from May until September 1787. On September 
5, the Copyright clause was agreed without debate. Congress should be empowered 
‘To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.’ (Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8) 
 
The first federal Copyright Act was passed in 1790: ‘An act for the encouragement of 
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and 
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.’ It was closely 
modelled on the Statute of Anne in its utilitarian rationale, limited 14 year term 
(renewable once), registration requirement, and the restriction of specified acts of 
‘printing, reprinting, publishing and vending’.xii  Particularly interesting is section 5 
which encourages pirating of foreign works, as ‘nothing in this act shall be construed 
to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting, or publishing within the 
United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any 
person not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the 
jurisdiction of the United States.’ The public interest is clearly articulated as the 
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national interest of a young nation, benefiting from the quick and cheap dissemination 
of the latest foreign advances in scientific and cultural thinking. The 1831 Copyright 
Act extends this prescription: one may import from abroad any kind of work without 
exception. 
 
In Wheaton v. Peters (1832, 29 Fed. Cas. 863), the leading case of early American 
copyright law, the US Supreme Court denied that there was any author’s right in 
common law (after publication) independent of the copyright statute. In the language 
of the court, copyright is a limited statutory grant of a monopoly which benefits the 
author in order to satisfy the public interest in learning. US copyright law remained 
steadfastly utilitarian until well into the 20th century. The Congress Report 
accompanying the 1909 Copyright Act still argues that the legislation ‘is not based 
upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, ... but upon the ground that 
the welfare of the public will be served’.xiii 
 
Most contemporary observers believed that the House of Lords in Donaldson had 
taken away the author’s common law right upon publication, and replaced it with a 
limited copyright granted by statute for the public’s benefit. As we shall see, though, 
it was later thought that Donaldson did admit an underlying natural common law 
right (cf. Rose 1993; Deazley 2003). Copyright’s utilitarian rationale was thus 
replaced with a broader concept, whose term and scope was derived from arguments 
about the author. The following section argues that this 19th century reinterpretation 
owes much to philosophical developments in German Idealism.  
 
Kant – Fichte – Hegel: The author arrives 
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Early print regulations--the statutes of bookseller’s guilds, crown privileges--were 
underpinned by collective structures. Copyright, on the other hand, is based on claims 
of individuals. Within 18th and 19th century discussions, those individual claims 
were most easily justified via the concept of property. As an English pamphlet of 
1747 claimed (William Warburton, A Letter from an Author to a Member of 
Parliament Concerning Literary Property, quoted in Rose 1993, p. 72): 
 
‘For that the Product of the Mind is as well capable of becoming Property, as that of 
the Hand, is evident from hence, that it hath in it those two essential Conditions, 
which, by the allowance of all Writers of Law, make things susceptible of Property; 
namely common Utility, and a Capacity of having its Possession ascertained.’ 
 
Despite Warburton’s optimism, it was not straightforward to support copyright as a 
form of property under the then prevailing Roman Law tradition of absolute 
ownership of land and movable things. The Roman Law obsession with occupancy as 
the source of all property claims is still reflected in Locke’s approach where the 
undoubted possession of one’s own labour is converted into individual ownership of 
previously common goods.  
 
In France, Denis Diderot experimented with a non-labour, genius based theory of 
literary creation, ironically in a pamphlet commissioned by the Paris Guild which--in 
the Stationers’ tradition--sought to establish a property title for printers via contracts 
with authors (1763, Lettre historique et politique adressée à un magistrat sur le 
commerce de la librairies). Diderot (who had translated some of John Locke’s 
writings) rejected the Lockean notion that intellectual territory could be appropriated 
like land.  For Diderot, an author’s bond with a work is inviolable not because of the 
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conversion of common into private goods but because of an act of first creation: 
‘what form of wealth could belong to a man, if not a work of the mind ... if not his 
own thoughts ... the most precious part of him, that will never perish, that will 
immortalize him.’ (quoted in Marshall 2001, p. 24) 
 
Immanuel Kant’s discussion Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks (‘of 
the illegality of reprinting’, 1781) similarly derives copyright from the natural right of 
self-expression rather than from a property right of authors or publishers. According 
to Kant, ‘in a book, conceived as a writing, the author speaks to his reader’. Thus the 
book as a physical entity is a mere ‘tool to transfer a speech to the audience.’ 
Following Kant, the Idealist philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, advanced what he 
deemed to be a proof that ascertaining intellectual possession was in fact possible via 
the concept of Form. In his 1792 article Beweis von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des 
Büchernachdrucks (‘proof of the illegality of reprinting’) Fichte identified the 
permanent feature of a book as ‘the form of the thoughts’, the result of a twofold 
abstraction: The intellectual part (‘das Geistige’) is abstracted from the physical part 
(‘printed paper’); and within the intellectual part ‘the form of the thoughts’ is 
abstracted from the ideas. Hence there are three types of property in a book. The 
physical book as full property is completely at the owner’s disposal. The ideas after 
being shared with the readers become a common property of the author and his 
readers. But the abstracted Form necessarily remains the author’s property, because it 
was ‘physically impossible’ to be appropriated by another person.  
 
There is a tension in Fichte’s theory between Form as a property (proprium) of the 
work from which it is abstracted, and Form referring to the process of formation 
rather than its result. This was addressed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.  
  18
Property for Hegel connects a person to his freedom; it is ‘the manifestation of a 
personality’ (‘das Dasein der Persönlichkeit’, Hegel 1828, § 51). Property becomes 
the foundation of a Philosophy of Right since, without property, a person is not 
conceivable at all. Hegel employed a twin concept of form (on the objective side) and 
formation (on the subjective side). Neither mere physical seizure nor mere symbolic 
marking of the property is an appropriate way to acquire property, but ‘formation’ is. 
Thus formation has in Hegel’s theory a similar function as labour in Locke’s. With 
respect to intellectual property, Hegel distinguishes between disposable things of 
‘external nature’ and inalienable ‘inner’ capabilities. An author may sell but the right 
to use a ‘single production’ of his intellectual capabilities for a ‘restricted period’. 
After buying and reading a book, its ideas are indeed the property of the buyer. The 
buyer is in possession of the ‘capability to express himself in exactly this way’.  But 
this capability can never be his property, since it remains with the author. 
 
The perpetual bond between an author and his work in Fichte’s and Hegel’s theories 
was combined with the Kantian ‘right of expression’ in Eduard Gans’ justification of 
performance rights. Gans, a Hegel follower and professor of Law at Berlin 
University, was referring to theatre plays when he wrote in 1832:  
In performances the author exposes himself to the risk of disapproval and thus 
the dramatic author should be able to decide every time anew to which public 
he presents his work. The opinion according to which a play once published 
may be performed on every stage, is wrong for two reasons, first, it allows 
someone to enrich oneself at another’s expense and, secondly, it exposes 
someone to a danger, to which he possibly does not want to be exposed. (Gans 
1832, p. 381).  
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Since that time to use a work means not only to accept the authorship of a dramatist 
or a composer but also to recognise that everything ever done with the work is 
associated with the author‘s personality. Copyright concepts in German Idealism thus 
deviate from property concepts in the exclusive, transferable sense that Anglo-
American liberalism derived via Locke from Roman law.  Kant’s concept of 
copyright was based on a person’s right to express himself. In Fichte’s and Hegel’s 
theories, while an author’s ownership of his intellectual creation provides the 
justification for copyright, this property is inalienable and thus, in an Anglo-
American legal sense, not property at all.  
 
Abstract works: The road from Paris to Berne 
We have so far identified the main justificatory avenues for individual copyrights 
developed during the 18th century: (1) the labour theory of property initiated by John 
Locke, expressed in the debates around the author’s common law rights; (2) the 
utilitarian incentive to creative production, implicit in the Act of Anne, reasserted in 
Donaldson v. Becket, and canonised in the Constitution of the United States; (3) the 
personality theory advanced within German Idealism. 
 
The early 19th century sees a paradigm shift towards the concepts that characterise 
modern copyright law. Three features appear in seminal legislation such as the 
French revolutionary laws of 1791 and 1793; the Prussian Law of 1837; and 
Talfourd’s Act (1842) in the UK: 
(1) The author becomes the source of protection. The term calculation 
shifted from the date of publication to the life of the author 
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(including a post mortem allowance to cover the author’s 
dependants).  
(2) Protected subject matter extends beyond printed books to literary 
and artistic creations in a wide sense (including music). A 
threshold criterion of merit (i.e. originality) is introduced. 
(3) Restricted acts refer to an abstract work identity rather than printed 
matter. Performing rights are introduced for dramatic and 
musical works; adaptations, such as excerpts or instrumental 
arrangement, and transcriptions of sermons and lectures become 
restricted as unauthorised derivatives. 
 
This new conception of copyright has been recognised by many academic 
commentators as a crucial moment. Sherman and Bentley (1999, pp. 2-6) date the 
transformation within the British tradition from what they call a ‘pre-modern’ to a 
‘modern’ intellectual property law to ‘the middle period of the 19th Century’: 
Authors within critical literary theory (Woodmansee 1984; Woodmansee and Jaszi 
1994; Boyle 1996) and the sociology of copyright (Marshall 2001) have associated 
this transformation with the emerging romantic conception of the author around the 
turn of the 19th century. We offer a different account, emphasising a process of 
abstraction that has an important source in Idealist philosophical thought which fused 
in the early 19th century with the exclusive, transferable property concept that had 




The first copyright statutes that take their lead (in term and scope) from the author are 
the French revolutionary Acts of 1791 (regarding performances of theatre and 
musical drama) and 1793 (regarding the sale and dissemination of artistic works of 
any genre) which replaced the old system of publishers’ rights. The Act of 19 January 
1791 introduces for the first time a post mortem ownership of 5 years, while the 
famous decree of 19 July 1793 (‘Declaration of the Rights of Genius’) grants a 
general transferable life of author term (plus 10 years). The philosophical basis of the 
French laws, however, is somewhat uncertain. On the one hand, we have expression 
related justifications. As Le Chapelier put it in his famous speech introducing the 
decree (quoted in Davies 2002, p. 137): ‘The most sacred, the most legislate, the most 
unassailable ... the most personal of properties, is a work which is the fruit of the 
imagination of a writer.’ On the other hand, there is a strong public interest 
undercurrent suspicious of exclusive control. Condorcét had argued in the 1776 
pamphlet Fragments sur la liberté de la presse that literary property was not a natural 
individual right but ‘founded in society itself’ (quoted in Hesse 1991, p. 103). 
According to Hesse, the revolutionary laws represented copyright as a reward to the 
author as public servant, not as the Lockean property right of liberal individualism. 
Ginsburg (1990) suggests that early French copyright was indeed very similar to the 
Anglo-American tradition, with the courts regularly balancing the rights of the 
authors with the needs of the public.xv 
 
In the context of the argument advanced in this chapter, these early French author 
laws contain the first signs of rights granted without formalities (all privileges were 
abolished), and of rights granted for public performance. The imminent paradigm 
shift toward the protection of all instantiations of abstract works can be nicely 
illustrated with the changing protection afforded to music.  
  22
 
The Statute of Anne did not cater specifically for music, though case law developed 
classifying sheet music as ‘writings’ within the meaning of the Act. In the wake of 
Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Becket, a test case was launched by Johann 
Christian Bach (the youngest son of J. S. Bach) and Carl Friedrich Abel, then at the 
height of their fame as organisers of a popular London concert series. The dispute 
concerned an unauthorized edition of a Bach lesson and sonata published by 
Longman & Lukey. On 18 March 1773, the case was brought in Chancery but it was 
only in 1777 that it was finally heard, again before Lord Chief Justice Mansfield. 
Cowper reported it thus (Small, 1985): 
Lord Mansfield called on Mr. Wood [attorney for the defendant] to begin; and 
without hearing Mr. Robinson [attorney for the plaintiff] in answer, said, the 
case was so clear and the arguments such, that it was difficult to speak 
seriously upon it. The words of the Act of Parliament are very large: ‘books 
and other writings.’ It is not confined to language or letters. Music is a 
science; it may be written; and the mode of conveying the ideas, is by signs 
and marks. A person may use the copy by playing it, but it has no right to rob 
the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing of them for his 
own use. If the narrow interpretation contended for in the argument were to 
hold, it would equally apply to algebra, mathematics, arithmetic, 
hieroglyphics. All these are conveyed by signs and figures. There is no colour 
for saying that music is not within the Act. Afterwards, on Monday, June 
16th, the Court certified in these words, ‘Having heard counsel and 
considered the case, we are of the opinion, that a musical composition is a 
writing within the Statute of the 8th of Queen Anne’. 
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Note that protection was expressly confirmed only against ‘multiplying copies’ of 
printed material, while any ‘person may use the copy by playing it’. No protection for 
the work itself whose identity was still uncertain!xvi  
 
A favourite argument of publishers remained that they had acquired a copy 
legitimately.  They thus denied that a musical work could be owned independently of 
what they were actually selling (i.e. a copy of a manuscript of ostentatiously 
‘uncertain’ authorship obtained from a third party). In J. C. Bach’s second law suite 
(also filed in 1773, but probably settled out of court), the defendants Longman & 
Lukey admitted ‘that the said three symphonys entitled as follows: Three symphonies 
in 8 parts for Violins Hoboys Horns Tenor and Bass were purchased from The Hague 
by [Dutch publisher] Hummell’, this being a ‘constant, uniform and well known 
custom and practice’ (Allen-Russell 2002, p. 27). 
 
The emerging modern regime of copyright (as epitomised by the Berne Convention) 
employs a new concept of an abstract authored work to which all acts of exploitation 
are related, be they publication, engraving, reprinting, recital, translation or 
arrangement. Previously, each of these activities were subject to their own separate 
regulation (or non-regulation) according to specific policy circumstances. We can 
trace the formation of the new regime in two important statutes of the early 19th 
century. 
 
Legal historians consider the Prussian Act of 1837 as the most influential Copyright 
Act in 19th century Germany, integrating for the first time the various regulations of 
the publishing industries into a comprehensive ‘Gesetz zum Schutze des Eigenthums 
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an Werken der Wissenschaft und der Kunst gegen Nachdruck und Nachbildung’ or 
‘Law for the protection of property in works of science and the arts from reprint and 
imitation’. The Prussian Act came into force on 11 June 1837, and was the first 
copyright law in Germany to employ an extensive concept of art including literature, 
music and the fine arts. It figured as the model for Germany’s evolving federal laws. 
 
Significantly, the drafters of the Prussian Copyright Act included the term ‘property’ 
in the title, referring to Fichte’s concept (albeit without citing his name): ‘The buyer 
of a book gets by the purchase the physical property in his copy and the right to use 
and to process the expressed thoughts in his particular manner. What inviolably 
remains the author’s and can be identified as the real intellectual property [das 
eigentliche Geistes-Eigenthum], is the particular form, in which he has expressed his 
thoughts. These principles are not new, they already have been laid down in the 90s 
of the last century by learned men who made an effort, to develop the particular 
matter of reprint out of its own nature.’ (Philipsborn, preliminary paper to the Act, 
quoted in Wadle 1988, p. 65) 
 
The Act was influenced by a sustained campaign led by Adolph Martin Schlesinger, 
Carl Maria von Weber’s publisher and a leading figure in Prussia’s musical 
establishment. Schlesinger resented unauthorised arrangements, in particular of 
Weber’s blockbuster operas Der Freischütz (1821) and Oberon (1826), which were 
of great commercial value.xvii 
 
In 1822, Schlesinger filed a complaint at the Berlin town court against a Freischütz 
piano arrangement of Viennese provenience that had been sold in Berlin book shops. 
The judge commissioned an expert opinion from the famous poet and composer 
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E.T.A. Hoffmann. Hoffmann, a lawyer by training and former Prussian civil servant, 
was asked whether the Viennese piano score was ‘arranged along’ Schlesinger’s 
piano score. The Prussian statute book of 1794 (Allgemeines Landrecht) explicitly 
had included ‘musical compositions’ under the subjects protected against reprinting. 
However, Hoffmann argued that the specific sections for arrangements should not be 
applied to musical composition, because 
‘it is impossible to extract musical compositions in the same way, as it can be 
done with books. Reprint of a composition would only take place when an 
original would be ‘reengraved’ [nachgestochen] and reprinted identically with 
the original.’ (Kawohl 2002, p. 269) 
 
According to Hoffmann, Schlesinger’s copyright did not involve the rights to an 
abstract work ‘Der Freischütz’; it was confined to the singular piano score version 
that he had published. The subject matter of copyright was a work of print – a copper 
engraving. Hoffmann drew a comparison to works of art. A copper engraving 
showing a painting was not infringing a copyright in this painting. Another engraving 
of the same painting was an infringing copy of the first copper plate only if it was a 
counterdraw, but not if it was modelled on the original painting.  
 
The key point of  Hoffmann’s argument was its denial of the abstraction which would 
soon be pervasive in European laws. Schlesinger’s claim for damages was refused. 
Between 1821 and 1837, Schlesinger filed at least six complaints in Prussian courts 
and made repeated applications for an amendment of the arrangement rules of the 
Allgemeines Landrecht.  He eventually saw success with the new copyright law of 
1837. Here is a summary of its provisions. 
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[Insert Table 2: Prussian Act 1837] 
 
In Britain, the key legislation fusing author and property norms is the Copyright Act 
of 1842. By the early 1800s, the utilitarian rationale implicit in English copyright law 
since the Act of Anne (1710), and sustained in the case of Donaldson v. Becket 
(1774) had become diluted. The House of Lords ruling in Donaldson was 
increasingly seen as a compromise between those who denied author’s rights 
altogether and those who  asserted a perpetual property in the produce of labour. It 
was argued that even if perpetual copyright had been rejected, the author still had a 
natural right to his work. In this reading, the natural or common law right of the 
author and the statute became merged. In 1814, a revised statute extended the 
copyright term for the first time to life of the author (or 28 years, whichever was 
longer).xviii  
 
In 1837, the year of the new Prussian Act, a campaign was launched by Thomas 
Noon Talfourd, a member of parliament, lawyer, author and friend of leading figures 
of the romantic literary scene. Several draft bills were submitted to Parliament 
supported by letters and petitions from William Wordsworth, Robert Southey, 
Thomas Carlyle and Hartley Coleridge. Their main aim was an extension of the 
copyright term to author’s lifetime plus 60 years (while existing copyrights would 
revert to the author after 28 years). The theoretical basis were new concepts of 
romantic theory as well as the more traditional Lockean labour arguments. As 
Talfourd put it in a speech to Parliament: why should literary property not ‘last as 
long as the works which contain truth and beauty live?’ (Talfourd 1837, p. 8; quoted 
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in Rose 1993, p. 111)  Talfourd’s disciple J.J. Lowndes wrote, in a supporting 
Treatise:  
‘For the object of the Bill is not to give greater value to the light and trivial 
productions of the day, which either reap a sufficient and quick reward from 
their admirers, or fall with well merited contempt into oblivion; but to secure 
to authors of genius and learning - whose works, although they become the 
classics of the country, often make their way but slowly into public favour - 
some slight pecuniary advantage, by extending their Copyright for a further 
period, at the very time it has commenced to be valuable, and to repay them 
for their long and unceasing labours. (Lowndes 1840, p. 101) 
 
Talfourd’s Bill reached the committee stage but not a final vote before the general 
election of 1841 in which Talfourd lost his seat. A revised copyright bill was passed 
early in the next parliament, compromising on the post mortem term (now seven 
years pma) while preserving Talfourd’s structure. The Act of 1842 concentrates on 
books, but extends the right of ‘representation or performance’ to ‘dramatic pieces’ 
and ‘musical compositions’. The abstraction of authored works of art remains 
tentative, as reflected in ambiguous wordings about abridgements, anthologies, 
translations and dramatizations. All rights were subject to entry in the Book of 
Registry at Stationers’ Hall, revealing a tension in the law: if the new rationale of 
copyright derived from the character of abstract, original, authored works (as opposed 
to the earlier incentive to the creation or dissemination of useful products), then its 
legal protection should coincide with the moment of creation not publication (Kawohl 
and Kretschmer 2003, p. 221).  
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[Insert Table 3: UK Act 1842] 
 
The formation of modern copyright law was completed with the Berne Convention of 
1886, elevating an international regime that took its term and scope from the creator, 
regardless of subsequent ownership or public policy implications. Led by Victor 
Hugo, a preliminary Congress on Literary and Artistic Property was held in Brussels 
in 1858 and adopted the following principles (quoted from Petri 2002, p. 116): 
the author’s ownership rights to his works of art and literature should be 
expressed in the laws of ‘all civilised peoples’; 
all countries should recognise the same rights of non-nationals to their works 
as they did to works of their own citizens [the principle of national treatment]; 
copyright legislation in all countries should rest on a common foundation. 
 
At the diplomatic conference in Berne in 1886, the principle of national treatment 
was established, but the minimum standards that should apply regardless of national 
traditions remained quite weak.xix Not until the Berlin conference of 1908 was it 
agreed that the rights granted under Berne should not be contingent on national 
formalities. The structure of the Berlin conference is still the bedrock of modern 
international copyright law. The US, for so long reluctant to follow the route to a 
droit d’auteur, eventually acceded to Berne in 1989 when the export interests of its 
copyright industries in Hollywood and Redmond had become paramount. In 1994, the 
TRIPS Agreement (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Article 
9.1) incorporated the Berne standards into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Any country that wishes to participate in global trade (by the latest counts, the WTO 
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has more than 140 members) must now enact exclusive transferable copyrights for 
more than a generation. 
 
The minimum term of Berne has remained at author’s life plus 50 years while Europe 
(with the 1993 Directive on harmonising the term of copyright protection) and the 
United States (with the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act) have adopted an 
extended term of 70 years post mortem auctoris. At the insistence of the US, the droit 
moral introduced with the Rome revisions (1928) of the Berne Convention was 
omitted from TRIPS: Article 6bis of the Rome revisions provided for the right to 
claim first authorship of a work (paternity right) and the right to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification which would be prejudicial to the honour 
or reputation of the author (integrity right). The droit moral is distinct from copyright 
as an economic property right in that it cannot be transferred or waived. We shall 
argue in the next section that this distinction may be the way forward. 
 
Below is a table summarising the structure of rights under Berne: 
 
[Insert Table 4: Berne Convention 1886, Berlin Act 1908]  
 
Whither now? 
Ever since the 18th century Battle of the Booksellers, when Stationers evoked an 
absolute author’s right that they had acquired (so they argued) via contract, the 
justifications for copyright have been extremely confused. Samuel Johnson’s 
comments in 1773 (as reported by Boswell) neatly illustrate the different arguments: 
‘There seems (he said) to be in authours a stronger right of property than that by 
occupancy; a metaphysical right, a right, as it were, of creation, which should from its 
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nature be perpetual; but the consent of nations is against it, and indeed reason and the 
interests of learning are against it; for were it to be perpetual, no book, however 
useful, could be universally diffused amongst mankind, should the proprietor take it 
into his head to restrain circulation.’xx  The decision in Donaldson v. Becket (1774) 
did little to stem the tide that was transforming a sensible investment incentive into a 
generation long burden on cultural activity, ostensibly under the guise of the author’s 
original expression. 
 
Private property can be defined negatively as the right to exclude. Access to property 
becomes conditional on the discretionary decision of the owner. Property entails the 
right to say NO. It is widely accepted in (utilitarian) economic theory that property 
rights are justified if they prevent a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 
1968). For example, fish stocks held in common are liable to deplete because there is 
no individual owner who has an incentive in their preservation. (For further 
discussion of this argument see chapter 3 below.)  From a public interest perspective, 
though, property rights should not be more far-reaching than needed to achieve this 
welfare purpose. In the case of intellectual property, in particular, they should not 
encroach on others’ ‘freedom of expression’ more than is necessary to give an 
incentive to creative expression and dissemination in the first place. Historically, 
however, this utilitarian perspective has been superseded by a second family of 
property justifications, stemming from John Locke’s notion of men’s ‘natural’ 
entitlement to the fruit of their labour, and from the Hegelian notion of rights as the 
‘manifestation of a personality’. The form and scope of acceptable rights under these 
premises is somewhat elusive. In particular, it is not clear how far other people’s 
expression can be justifiably limited by such property claims.xxi 
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In this section, we shall finally unbundle the concepts of creator and investor which, 
as we have seen, have formed an unholy alliance in the formation of modern 
copyright law. The argument is presented from premises that attempt to capture 
widely held views in modern societies (which echo some of the justificatory 
strategies discussed earlier).  
 
Proposition 1: There is no unified category of right owners, covering creators 
(authors) and investors (producers).  
 
Creators have four main interests:  
- to see their work widely reproduced and distributed 
- to receive credit for it 
- to earn a financial reward relative to the commercial value of the 
work 
- to be able to engage creatively with other works (in adaptation, 
comment, sampling etc). 
 
Regarding the structure of author rights, this leads to three conclusions: 
The creator has little to gain from exclusivity (it prevents widest 
distribution; it prevents access to other works; it does not ensure 
financial reward) 
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The creator has little to gain from transferability (under normal 
contractual practices, particularly in the media, the creator will 
be bought out in a one-off commercial transaction) 
The creator has a lot to gain from the so-called droit moral (a kind of 
creative trade mark, ensuring integrity of origin). 
 
In the past, authors’ interests could only be met with considerable economic 
inefficiencies (mainly caused by the costs of administrating rights). Digital 
technology offers new possibilities of tracing use and rewarding the creator. 
Transforming collecting societies into regulatory bodies answering to society at large 
(not only to rights owners) may be the best way forward (cf. Kretschmer 2002). 
 
 
Proposition 2:  
Investors want exclusive and transferable property rights, to extract maximum 
returns from their investments. Exclusive rights, however, come at a cost to society.  
Useful works become more expensive than they would have been (this 
is a direct consumer loss). 
Works become available for creative engagement only on the terms of 
the right holder (this means in practice a loss of cultural 
diversity, innovation and critique). 
Automatic returns from a back catalogue of works subsidise existing 
large right holders, creating an entry barrier to the creative 
industries (this is an anti-competitive effect). 
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Regarding the structure of copyright as a property right, this leads to one conclusion: 
Investors should be granted exclusive terms of protection only as a 
response to market failure: i.e. where without the incentive of 
exclusivity, a work in the ‘useful arts’ would not be produced 
and distributed at all. 
  
The normal exploitation cycle of cultural products suggests that a short exclusive 
term would be sufficient. If the first statutory copyright, the Statute of Anne, granted 
a term of 14 years (renewable once), the faster dissemination and exploitation 
environment of digital technologies would suggest an even shorter term. An extreme 
example of that rationale is the UK’s first design copyright, the 1787 ‘Act for the 
Encouragement of Designing and Printing of Linens, Cottons, Calicos and Muslins’. 
It provided a producer head start of less than one season by granting an exclusive 
right to print and reprint for 2 months; in 1794, the term was extended to 3 months 
(Sherman and Bently 1999, p. 63).  
 
Star creators 
Many creators have demanded control over their artistic output which, they say, can 
only be ensured through exclusive rights. In commercial practice, however, artistic 
control is only available to a few star creators whose bargaining power is sufficient to 
benefit from the exclusivity and transferability of rights. (See chapter 4 below.)  Only 
the interests of star creators are similar to investor interests. They benefit 
disproportionally from the current copyright system. 
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Figures provided in the 1996 UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report on 
the British Performing Right Society (PRS) show that 80% of author members earned 
less than £1000 from performance royalties for 1993; and that 10% of authors 
received 90% of the total distribution. Similarly, according to German music 
copyright society GEMA’s yearbook for 1996/7, 5% of members received 60% of the 
total distribution. We have calculated that in Germany and the UK between 500 and 
1500 composers can live substantially off copyright royalties. There are indications 
that such winner-take-all markets are prevalent in most cultural industries. For the 
US, Tebbel claimed in a 1976 study that only 300 self-employed writers could live 
off the copyright system (Tebbel 1976). For 90% of authors, the copyright system did 
not provide a sufficient reward. The creative base of a modern society is supported by 
other means. 
 
Early in their careers, many creators wish to become known by all available means, 
including being copied without permission. Piracy is welcome if source credits are 
given. Once creators have become famous, they typically perform a U-turn. Their 
monetary interests suddenly compete with investors’ interests, aligning both in their 
defence of exclusive rights. ‘Take a stand for creativity. Take a stand for copyright.’ 
implored a petition to the European Parliament signed by 400 recording artists in 
1999. ‘We make our living through our music. The music that we create touches the 
lives of millions of people all over the world. Our creativity and our success depend 
on strong copyright protection. We now need your help.’xxii This dubious harmony of 
interests remains the official industry line in its piracy campaign: ‘Ultimately, if 
creators do not get paid, you will not get music’ (John Kennedy, President and Chief 




We believe that despite such rhetoric we are reaching the end of the period of 
copyright expansion traced in this chapter. Within a generation, copyright laws will 
be unrecognisable, abandoning the Berne paradigm. The history of copyright supports 
arguments for a system in which short terms of exclusivity, encouraging fast 
exploitation, are followed by a remuneration right for the life time of the creator. As 
the following chapters in this book demonstrate copyright practice is already 
changing, as, in their various ways, bootleggers, DJs, samplers, consumers and 
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Table 4: Berne Convention (1886), Berlin revision (1908)  
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i This chapter draws on the following previously published research: Kretschmer 
(2000); Kawohl (2001); Kawohl (2002a); Kawohl and Kretschmer (2003); and 
Kretschmer (2003). Tables 1-4 are taken from Kawohl and Kretschmer (2003). The 
propositions of section ‘Whither now?’ are taken verbatim from Kretschmer (2003). 
ii In the law and economics literature (Maughan 2001), two further features of 
property rights are identified: universality (i.e. a complete set of property 
relationships between all parties is specified) and enforceability (i.e. the rights are 
stable and can be reliably asserted). 
iii ‘Piracy’ in its literal meaning asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction over robbery on 
the sea. The Oxford English Dictionary traces this use back to 1552. Piracy as 
‘infringement of right conferred by a patent or copyright’ is first referenced in 1771. 
An early example of its use in court with reference to music is in D’Almaine v. 
Boosey (1834): ‘To publish, in the form of quadrilles and waltzes, the airs of an opera 
of which there exists an exclusive copyright, is an act of piracy.’ (quoted in 
McFarlane 1986) 
iv It should be noted that the prescription that you should not appropriate what is not 
yours does not presuppose a conception of copyright as individual exclusive 
property. Unauthorised non-commercial use that acknowledges its source may be 
consistent with the Eighth Commandment.  
v The orthodox expression of this argument is in Landes and Posner (1989). 
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vi The first systematic regime of printing privileges as a means of censorship was 
installed in France in 1521. Under the 1723 Code de la Librarie, the book trade was 
still regulated via the Paris Guild, supporting perpetual monopolies (Hesse 1991). 
vii Johann Wolfgang v. Goethe appears to hold the record, obtaining in 1825 39 
privileges in different jurisdictions for the edition of his collected works. 
viii The authoritative text of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government is the third edition 
of 1698. The quotes are all from Chapter 5. In recent political philosophy, there has 
been much debate about the interpretation and scope of the Lockean proviso. For 
good discussions in the context of intellectual property, see Hughes (1988); Hettinger 
(1989); Drahos (1996); Shiffrin (2001); Fisher (2001). 
ix Locke himself argued strongly against the Stationers’ monopoly, intervening in the 
debates surrounding the renewal of the 1662 Licensing Act. In an open letter in 1694, 
Locke wrote that ‘nobody should have any peculiar right in any book which has been 
in print fifty years, but any one as well as another might have the liberty to print it; 
for by such titles as these, which lie dormant, and hinder others, many good books 
come quite to be lost. [N]or can there be any reason in nature why I might not print 
[classical texts] as well as the Company of Stationers, if I thought fit. This liberty, to 
any one, of printing them, is certainly the way to have them the cheaper and the 
better.’ (quoted in Shiffrin 2001, p. 154f) 
x In the literature, the Statute of Anne is variously cited with the years 1709 (the year 
it was enacted: this is today the usual way of citing Statutes) and 1710 (the year it 
came into force). Note that English legislation at the time referred to the year of reign 
of the monarch (‘The Statute of the 8th of Queen Anne’), which does not coincide 
with the modern calendar year. 
xi A graphic illustration of the competitive practices of 18th century music publishing 
in England is provided in the autobiography (1803) of Charles Dibdin (1745-1814), a 
composer of highly successful popular songs. When Dibdin resorted to self-
publishing in 1790 in order to increase the lowly returns offered by the established 
publishing houses, ‘the music-shops discouraged their sale ... [and I] began, as usual, 
to feel their power, and my own incapacity to struggle against it... I had scarcely 
opened my shop, when the clamours, among the music-sellers, became universal... 
Some of these crotchet-mongers made an open declaration that they would not sell 
any article in my catalogue’ (quoted in Hunter 1986, p. 243). Avoiding London’s 
publishing oligopoly, Charles Dibdin toured the country with his music and survived. 
Here are contrasting figures of Dibdin’s payments, before and after he opened his 
own business. In 1768, he received £45 for the music of The Padlock, the vocal score 
alone selling 10,000 copies in thirteen years. Another group of songs which Dibdin 
claims to have sold for £60, made the publisher £500. As self-publisher, Dibdin sold 
10,750 copies of the song Greenwich Pensioner, yielding profits of more than £400. 
In Germany, Georg Philipp Telemann (1681-1767) was the archetypal 18th century 
musical entrepreneur. At the outset of his career, he was still forced into a feudal 
contract (1717), preventing the communication of new compositions beyond his 
court employer. From 1721, as music director of the independent merchant city of 
Hamburg, he pioneered many new exploitation techniques. Since it was unseemly to 
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charge for church concerts, he ‘ordered guards to the doors who prevented anybody 
from entering who had no printed copy of the Passion [performed]’ (from 
Telemann’s Autobiography in Mattheson, 1740). In order to prevent unauthorised 
reprints of his works, Telemann invented a music magazine, serialising his 
compositions, publishing one movement at a time (Schleuning 1984). 
xii Not suprisingly ‘maps’ are mentioned in a prominent position. Unlike novels and 
scholarly books which were easily reprinted from imported English originals, maps 
of, say, West Virginia had to be supplied by domestic engravers and printers. In 
England maps had qualified as copyrightable subject matter only some years earlier, 
in the Engraving Copyright Act 1766. Since maps and sea charts necessarily 
resemble one another in form, the more so as they accurately represent the reality, a 
threshold of originality could not easily be defined. Lord Mansfield in Sayre v. 
Moore (1 East 351, K.B. 1785) admitted, ‘whoever has it in his intention to publish a 
chart may take advantage of all prior publications’, but acknowledged the claimant’s 
correction of some soundings and (new) application of the Mercator principle. 
Copyright in maps could only be justified within a utilitarian rather than a natural 
author’s rights framework. Thus the turn from a utilitarian towards a author’s right 
based copyright can be identified in a ‘shift of categories’: As Lord Justice Sir W. M. 
James, L.J. clarified in Stannard v. Lee (6 Ch App 346, 21, 22 March 1871): 
‘Formerly maps had been considered artistic works, now they were to be brought into 
their proper place as literary works. And rightly so, in my opinion, for maps are 
intended to give information in the same way as a book does.’ (see Kawohl 2002c) 
xiii By the late 20th century, the utilitarian rationale of US copyright had succumbed 
to the lobbying efforts of increasingly powerful multinational right holders, most 
dramatically with the 1998 Sonny Bono Act, which extended the US copyright term 
by 20 years to life plus 70 years (or 95 years for works ‘for hire’). The bill was 
sponsored by Congressmen who received significant campaign contributions from 
Disney. In the Supreme Court challenge of the Act (2003, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S.), an amici curiae brief by a group of economists, including five Nobel laureates, 
suggested that a copyright term of life plus 70 years provided 99.99% of the value of 
protection in perpetuity; i.e. virtually perpetual copyright economically speaking. It 
is evident that a retrospective extension to the term of copyright restricts public 
access whilst not providing any additional incentive to cultural production. Still, the 
majority of judges (7:2 votes) refused to rule against the extension on the grounds 
that the Court could not challenge the powers of Congress in a matter of policy. One 
of the two dissenting judges advanced a more principled constitutional analysis: 
‘This statute will cause serious expression-related harm. It will likely restrict 
traditional dissemination of copyrighted works. It will likely inhibit new forms of 
dissemination through the use of new technology. It threatens to interfere with efforts 
to preserve our Nation’s historical and cultural heritage and efforts to use that 
heritage, say, to educate our Nation’s children. It is easy to understand how the 
statute might benefit the private financial interests of corporations or heirs who own 
existing copyrights. But I cannot find any constitutionally legitimate, copyright-
related way in which the statute will benefit the public.’ (537 U.S. (2003); Breyer, J., 
dissenting, at 26). See also Breyer, 1970. 
xiv For modern ‘rule-utilitarians’, the inviolability of property rights may itself be 
justified from the outcomes of such a system. This line of thinking goes back to 
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Jeremy Bentham who remarked that ‘a state cannot grow rich except by an inviolate 
respect for property’ (quoted in Drahos 1996, ch. 9). 
xv Compare Louis XVI’s letter to his government (1776): ‘Every effort should be 
made to deal, as soon as possible, with the requests of the Parisian and provincial 
publishing houses regarding ownership rights to works and the duration of privileges. 
A large number of authors have made representations to me to this effect, and I 
realize the matter is one close to the heart of scholars. ... to an author, a privilege is 
the fruits of his labour, to a publisher a guarantee against costs. ... The author should 
be given precedence, and assuming the publisher’s share stands in proportion to his 
expenses and he is able to return a reasonable profit, he should have no cause to 
complain.’ (Dock 1963, p. 127; quoted in Petri 2002, p. 62f) The King’s intervention 
led to a rejection of publisher’s rights beyond the lifetime of the author. 
xvi The Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht (1794, 1.11§ 997) had listed musical 
compositions alongside maps and copper engravings (Wadle 1996, p. 176), and a 
publishers’ petition (Dunker 1834) to the federal assembly (Bundesversammlung) 
mentions musical compositions after mathematical schedules but before maps. The 
official commentary on the copyright act of the German state of Saxony still stated in 
1844: ‘Musical compositions do not belong to the category of products of literature 
because the means of representation are symbols, not script. They belong to the 
products of art, of the fine arts. The law is intended to protect works of fine art in 
addition to the products of literature.’ (Meinert 1844, p. 16) 
Composers probably formed the concept of a performing right as early as they 
conceived of publishing rights. In 1664, the German composer Heinrich Schütz 
stated in the preface to the printed edition of his Christmas Oratorio that 
performances could only take place with the author’s consent (‘mit des Authoris 
Bewilligung’). As a practical solution, he offered the orchestral parts separately 
against an additional fee (MGG 1966: 1168). During the 17th century, a performance 
royalty system became common practice at the Paris theatres where monitoring 
constituted no serious problem. In 1791, Pierre-Augustin Beaumarchais instigated a 
bureau for collecting royalties for writers and composers of dramatic work (in 1829, 
this became the Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques, still active today). 
It was not until the early 19th century, that the right to public performance became an 
indicator of the emerging concept of an abstract authored work.  
Publishers immediately took advantage of the ruling in Bach v. Longman, registering 
music at the Stationers’ Company. Between 1770 and 1779, 35 scores were 
registered, during the last decade of the 18th century the figures reached 1828 (from 
the transcription of the register of the Worshipful Company of Stationers, analysed 
by Krummel 1975, quoted from Hunter 1986: p. 281). Yet, Hunter argues, composers 
seem not to have won an immediate improvement in earnings. Litigation was 
generally conducted between publishers (see Coover 1985). 
Note that despite the nascent provisions of music copyright, composers continued to 
use entrepreneurial, non-copyright strategies to make a living. Until well into the 
19th century, the most important sources of income for successful, independent 
composers were not publishing revenues but commissions, dedications and 
performances of new compositions. Handel and Mozart made their (changeable) 
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fortunes through organising the performance of their own works, a commercial route 
closed to many lesser composers. Not much of the fortunes accumulated by 
publishers such as the Ballard dynasty in Paris, Breitkopf & Härtel in Leipzig, 
Artaria in Vienna, or London’s father and son Walsh reached the composers.  John 
Walsh Senior published Handel’s first set of sonatas under a false Amsterdam 
imprint to avoid payments to the composer. After business relations were established, 
Handel received £20-£30 per opera or oratorio (Rasch 2001). John Walsh Senior’s 
estate amounted to £30,000 in 1736; his son left £40,000 thirty years later (Hunter 
1986, p. 75). 
 xvii Within two years of its first performance at the Berlin Royal Opera House, Der 
Freischütz had been performed for the 50th time. Apparently, 9,000 copies of his 
piano version were sold in only one year (Berlin had no more than 200,000 
inhabitants at the time). 
xviii For a lucid discussion of this subsequent re-interpretation of Donaldson v Becket, 
see Rose 1993, 107ff.   
xix First signatories were Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Britain, Haiti, Liberia, 
Switzerland and Tunesia. 
xx James Boswell, Life of Johnson, 1791; quoted in Rose 1993, p. 85. Johnson argued 
in favour of a term between 60 and 100 years (20 July 1763); cf. Locke’s reference to 
50 years in his 1694 intervention (note ix above). 
xxi The tension is present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which 
recognised in Article 27.(1) that ‘Everyone has the right freely to participate in the 
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits.’ But Article 27.(2) reads: ‘Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author.’ For discussion, see Drahos, 1999.  
xxii Petition ‘Artists Unite for Strong Copyright’, led by Jean Michel Jarre with the 
assistance of IFPI (19 January 1999), signed by among others Boyzone, the Corrs, 
Robbie Williams, Tom Jones, Eros Ramazotti, Mstisalav Rostropovich, Barbara 
Hendricks, Die Fantastischen Vier, Aqua and Roxette. Note that Robbie Williams 
later declared that Internet music file sharing is ‘great’ (MIDEM music trade fair, 
Cannes, January 2003). 
xxiii The German publishers’ campaign against the copyright exception for teaching 
and scientific research (§52a) argued: ‘If copies of books are free, nobody will buy 
originals. If nobody buys originals, nobody will publish books or journals. The 
result: If nobody publishes, Germany’s thinkers will soon have to look for a different 
employment’ (Advert Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 March 2003). 
